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This article interrogates the norms of good citizenship invoked in and across different social
domains, using the example of citizenship education in the UK as one field in which good
citizenship is constituted. It is possible to make visible the political struggle inherent in the
mechanisms of framing the good citizen by unpacking the differences between citizenship as acts,
status and virtues. This is a necessary step in assessing good citizenship claims in the absence of
moral and political absolutes. We deploy a two-tiered account of Butler’s theory of performativity
to examine how ordinary citizenship acts are preceded by elite rhetorical framing. We conclude that
citizenship, like democracy, is always enacted in particular contexts in which positioning, method
and motives play an important part.
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Introduction
Our aim in this article is to contribute to the important task of bringing to the debate
on good citizenship greater theoretical depth and empirical richness. We interrogate
the norms of good citizenship invoked in different social domains and extend our
analysis across as well as within particular domains, using the example of citizen-
ship education in the UK to illustrate our argument. At the centre of our efforts is
the specification of a framework for analysing invocations of the good citizen. The
aim of this style of analysis is to reveal or unmask the making of conceptions of the
good citizen and good citizenship. The good citizen is a figure who is ‘framed’, or set
up, by political and academic observers alike; framed in the sense of viewed from a
certain perspective, and in the different sense of set up for a particular purpose (to
contribute to a sustainable society or cohesive community, for example). Indeed,
the frames constitute ideas of the good citizen and the desired practices that flow
from that: there is no single normative ideal outside frames. By deploying an
interpretative methodology, it is our intention to make visible the political struggle
inherent in the practices and mechanisms of framing the good citizen, and to
speculate on the possibility of assessing such claims in the absence of moral and
political absolutes.
We argue that a focus on good citizenship means a focus primarily on acts of
citizenship, showing how key actors performatively construct both the content
(approaches) and products (domains) of good citizenship, indicating a constitutive
relationship between ‘elite’ representations and ‘ordinary’ performative acts of
citizenship and their specific contexts. As we will go on to elaborate, the invocation
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of the good citizen is twofold: the frame itself is produced through elite actions (the
constitution of a domain and an approach) and in turn provides the repertoires of
possible acts and social roles that are deemed to be ‘good’, as performed by ordinary
would-be citizens themselves. Analysts therefore need to embrace the inevitable
plurality of conceptions of the good citizen, and would benefit from a specific set of
linked concepts that can genuinely help us to map and to understand invocations
of good citizenship. Given this plurality we also need cross-contextual ways in
which to judge varied claims about the capacities, behaviours and attitudes of good
citizens. Our hope is that the framework generated and illustrated here is suffi-
ciently flexible to aid analysis across countries, cultures and contexts, despite its
roots in UK experience. Because of its sensitivity to context, we argue that as an
interpretive device the framework can usefully ‘travel’.
The enigmatic figure of the ‘good citizen’ is conjured up regularly in UK politics—
Michael Sandel’s Reith Lectures (Sandel 2009) on ‘A New Citizenship’ provide a
prominent recent example—but the notion rarely comes under close analytical
scrutiny from the perspective of citizenship ‘acts’. This has been the case, we argue,
for two key reasons. First, established patterns of normative thinking have squeezed
out close analytical work, and second, where the latter has been evident it has been
confined too closely to single areas of concern or policy. Let us look at these two
issues briefly.
The notion of the good citizen is important, not least because it plays a key role in
politicians’ discourses, when some forms of behaviour among citizens are being
encouraged and others discouraged. Perhaps it is this role that makes scholars wary;
certainly the strongly normative (if not moralising) and often ideologically moti-
vated nature of good citizen discourse does not chime readily with aspirations to
analytical neutrality.
Of course, there is a long tradition of normative discussion in political theory
around models of citizenship. Republicans see good citizens as ideally possessing
certain virtues and oriented primarily to the collective good of the community.
Liberals see good citizens as individuals, with rights and freedoms, who respect the
rights and freedoms of others as they pursue their interests. Socialists see good
citizens as seekers and defenders of social and economic equality. Greens see good
citizens as those who live sustainably, and encourage the same in social and political
institutions. Feminists have viewed citizenship as a gendered term, not with-
out potential but needing transformation towards new forms of inclusion and
recognition.
Where norms of good citizenship are invoked by political scientists, they often rely
on culturally specific images of the democratic citizen derived from ancient Greece,
conflating citizenship with behaviour and values (Van Deth 2007, 404). The same
holds true for accounts of the ‘bad citizen’ (Christ 2006)—taken as someone
uninterested in public affairs. The relationship between good citizenship norms,
behaviour and virtues is an important one which we take up in the next section, but
it is important here to distinguish our approach from those that seek to gauge,
measure or define conceptions of good citizenship (Conover et al. 1991; Theiss-
Morse 1993). These accounts carefully and empirically examine shared norms,
understandings and self-identifications of the good citizen, but offer less sustained
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discussion of the practices and mechanisms associated with the rhetorical framing
of the good citizen—or the influences on how people arrive at understandings of the
good citizen.
Mapping these discussions and positions is a reasonable task, but differs from the
task we set ourselves here, which is to focus on how the good citizen is invoked in
particular contexts—deploying an interpretive mode in which normative discus-
sions play only one part. Sensitivity to context is central. This includes sensitivity to
the fate of good citizen discourse in different times or periods. Concern about
citizens’ attitudes and activities tends to come and go in waves. Different political
actors at different times raise citizenship issues as part of other current issues or
debates on the public agenda. In the 1980s, for example, debates centred on liberal
versus community notions in politics and political theory. In the UK today, citizen-
ship issues are raised in the complex and overlapping contexts of global dependen-
cies, movement of peoples, religion and tolerance, for example. Waves of concern
also give rise to new institutions; for example the government-linked NGO, the
Institute for Citizenship, was set up in the late 1980s as a response in part to the
then prime minister Margaret Thatcher’s assertion that there is ‘no such thing as
society’.
A further limitation of existing scholarly accounts is that invocations of the good
citizen tend to arise in specific domains of public concern or public policy. ‘Faith’
has been one prominent recent example. In the UK, issues of faith, culture and
citizenship have risen up the public agenda in the midst of concerns for community
cohesion and security following the attack on the World Trade Center in New York
on 11 September 2001 and specifically in the UK following the terrorist attack on
the London transport system of 7 July 2005. Positions within this domain of
citizenship discourse have differed widely. Government concerns have tended
towards security and cohesion; inter-faith groups have stressed the search for
common values, while academic observers have pointed out complexities of
within-faith and inter-faith connections and issues of definition of ‘faith’. Questions
of ‘Britishness’ (and ‘loyalty’, ‘shared values’ and ‘commitment’) have also been
prominent. These debates and contestations have jointly produced a new domain of
concern—that is, faith and the good citizen—specific to particular situated events
and in the context of a heightened state of anxiety about terrorist threats and ethnic
diversity in the UK. Just as in this one domain, invocations of the good citizen in
other domains, such as education, healthcare, environmental responsibility or the
citizenly responsibilities of corporations, are subject to sporadic and at times equally
fierce debate. The key point is that close attention to a single domain distracts from
the highly varied ways in which these very domains are constituted, reinforced and
contested. Attending to the constitution of these various domains requires us to
focus on citizenship as a set of practices, and requires that we distinguish between
citizenship acts, status and virtues.
Citizenship Acts, Status and Virtues
A key starting point is that the figure of the ‘good citizen’ emerges when the
primary focus is on acts of citizenship, rather than primarily on citizenship as a
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status. ‘Good’ citizenship is about what citizens do, rather than who they are. As Will
Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (1994, 353) have commented,
we should expect a theory of the good citizen to be relatively independent
of the legal question of what it is to be a citizen, just as a theory of the
good person is distinct from the metaphysical (or legal) question of what
it is to be a person.
It is worth noting that Kymlicka and Norman suggest that acts are ‘relatively
independent’ of status. This formulation denotes that there is a complex process of
interconnection between the two, despite the utility of keeping them analytically
separate. Citizenship ceremonies in the UK, for example, are about bestowing, or
symbolising the bestowal of, the formal status of British citizenship, but at the same
time participants take part in (or enact) through ceremonies a depiction of the
content of good citizenship. Visually UK citizenship ceremonies involve a display of
symbols—the crown, the flag and the regalia of authority of the local mayor or
other dignitary—conveying a sense of both citizenship and subjecthood. The cer-
emony’s pledge involves promising to ‘observe laws faithfully’ and bear ‘loyalty to
the UK’, which arguably cuts through other potential loyalties (for example to
Scotland or Wales, or to a faith community, or to a transnational or diasporic
community). Clearly, in this as in other cases, there is a close link between citizen-
ship as act and as status. At one and the same time, both (1) the status and (2) a
particular rendering of the status are performatively constituted through framing.
It is true that citizenship is most often understood as a status, for example qualifi-
cations of membership of the citizen body. But from citizenship ceremonies, edu-
cation and consumption to debates about corporate citizenship, we can see the
importance of practices and acts that carry ideas about what good citizens can and
should do. The notion of acts of citizenship here is offered and interpreted in broad
terms. They are acts that, according to certain framings, define good citizenship and
good citizenly conduct. This broad approach differs, for example, from Engin Isin
and Greg Nielsen’s (2008, 2) designation of acts of citizenship in terms of ruptures
in conventional modes of citizen action, that is, as a quite specific type of citizen
action, signifying a break from habitus. We take from Isin and Nielsen a concern for
the way in which acts produce subjects, but instead focus on ordinary acts-in-context
and their framing as virtuous. We therefore avoid making a clear distinction
between some extraordinary or transformational acts as ‘virtuous’ and everyday
practices as passive and apolitical. Transformational or rupturing acts clearly have
political purchase, but can also be used in themselves as normative and normalising
frames for good citizenship, as in UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s account of
Britain’s Everyday Heroes, which charts the civic contributions of ‘good people striv-
ing to make Britain a better place’ (Brown 2007, 12). Acts-in-context (as practices)
equally confer political struggle in so far as they perform or make subjects, and
when taken together with the constitutive nature of framing, the conditions of
possibility are set for the enacting of citizenship, the establishment of citizenship
roles and the creation of visions of the good citizen. For example, when looking at
the fairly prominent notion of corporate citizenship, one question to be asked is
whether, although corporations as such do not possess the legal status of citizens, by
acting like ‘good citizens’ they can claim for themselves some form of moral status of
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citizenship (see Thompson 2005; Moon et al. 2005, Néron and Norman 2008; and
Wood and Logsdon 2008 on the debate over whether corporations can be good
citizens).
Having illustrated the links between acts and status, we nonetheless keep ‘ordinary’
acts conceptually distinct from status and focus upon them in this article. This is
because the idea of the good citizen is primarily about what citizens do, or what
they should (or sometimes are forced to) do. It is acts, rather than status, that would
seem to distinguish ‘good’ from ‘bad’ citizens. As we shall see, a key part of what
citizens do concerns what they are enabled to do, in terms of what they know, what
skills they have, their access to material resources and what subject positions are
available to them as accepted norms, expectations and virtuous character. Melanie
White (2006, 111) notes that, while in political theory citizen character may be
recognised as a social construction, ‘the concept typically appears as a pre-political
good whose social origins are hypostatized or forgotten’. As such a moral or
behaviourist approach to political theory lends itself to the promotion of civic duty,
education for citizenship and character education—shared by liberals and civic
republicans alike (White 2005, 475; see also Dagger 1997, 195; Sabl 2005). This
moral orientation neglects questions of how citizen virtues, habits and competen-
cies are framed, and how these frames are assembled—or in White’s terms how the
character of the good citizen is governed (White 2005, 474). We are concerned in the
next section with how frames of the good citizen can be said to be performatively
produced, developing our interpretative method from the work of Judith Butler
(1990 and 1997) and Erving Goffman (1969 and 1974). It is to this framing that we
now turn.
Framing
The frames within which good citizenship is enacted are co-constructed by different
types of actor: elite and ordinary.1 Without wishing to reinforce a binary distinction
between the two, but rather seeking to explore the relationship between them, the
focus of this article is largely limited to relatively ‘elite’ actors—governments, other
public agencies, NGOs, corporations and indeed academic commentators—and
their constitution of ideas of the good citizen. A great many groups and individuals
can and do have ideas of good citizenship. But it is the framings by relatively elite
actors that are most often public, and that both enable and constrain the manner in
which citizenship is ‘lived’ by ordinary citizens. It is therefore crucial to address the
nature of specific framings of the good citizen, and the tensions that are inherent in
them (Van Deth 2009). These frames provide the roles through which specific acts,
status and virtues of citizenship are performed. ‘Good’ citizenship acts, in order to
be publicly understood as such, need to be performed within the parameters set by
the frame. In that sense (elite) actors enact the frames within which (ordinary)
citizens then enact/perform their good citizenship.
We deploy the notion of framing to capture the contextual particularity of invoca-
tions of the good citizen, whether it is in terms of the latter’s behaviours, attitudes
or capacities. Within the idea of framing, there are a number of other concepts that
specify factors we should attend to when looking at particular debates and claims
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about good citizenship. These concepts, taken together, are designed to help us to
capture the richness of the modes, styles and content of invocations of good
citizenship. Frames are not objective or unchanging entities. They are reinforced or
diminished by a variety of constitutive acts, and as such the term ‘framing’ captures
better than ‘frame’ the mechanisms and practices associated with invoking the good
citizen. In this section we will first set out the components of framing and the links
between them, and secondly clarify some important points concerning their
deployment, using the example of citizenship education in England for illustrative
purposes.
Framing consists of (1) a domain; and (2) an approach. The domain is the area of
concern within which different arguments about good citizenship are located. Key
areas of concern in the UK context, for example, are: the state of democracy; the
state of citizenship education; the fostering of governance; understanding national
character; environmental sustainability; community cohesion; or corporate citizen-
ship. A domain is the product of efforts to constitute particular ideas of good
citizenship; the approach is the means by which that constituting work is done.
Constituting the domain—for example, good corporate citizenship—in effect con-
stitutes a way to locate, recognise and interpret (and value) a developing repertoire
of acts with respect to good citizenship—acts which are not necessarily restricted to
individual persons as actors, but which incorporate, in the above instance, the acts
of institutions and corporations. There may be competing conceptions of a particu-
lar domain, and different approaches to establishing or analysing a given domain. In
fact, such competing can actually reinforce a sense of the presence or reality of the
domain in question, while ensuring that its boundaries and the relative importance
of its constituent elements remain contested.
The approach refers to how and why elite actors seek to constitute and reinforce
particular domains of good citizenship, and can in turn be broken down into its
constituent elements:
(2a) the positioning of the originator of certain arguments (both the subject’s
self-positioning and their institutional positioning, including self-imposed
and wider institutional constraints);
(2b) the motives of the originator in putting arguments about the good citizen
(self-assumed and self-described motives, as well as potential other-ascribed
and contextually suggested motives); and
(2c) the methods used by the originator. These include a range of approaches
familiar in social science and social and political theory, such as interpretive,
explanatory, critical and normative methods, as well as methods common-
place in contemporary politics such as agenda-setting, the representation of
problems to be solved, virtues to be promoted and pragmatic ways of achiev-
ing political goals.
Tracing particular cases through the field defined by these concepts leads to specific
conclusions about the good citizen within a given domain. The domain of educating
citizens is one sphere through which to interrogate framings of the good citizen and
citizenship claims—particularly in light of its fairly recent introduction as a com-
pulsory secondary school subject in England. It is an important domain for framing
the intersections between citizenship acts, status and the shaping of character,
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competence and virtue of future citizens. Citizenship education has also been
subjected to intense academic scrutiny (Osler 2000; McLaughlin 2000; Pearce and
Hallgarten 2000; Kerr et al. 2002; Heater 2004; Olssen 2004; Osler and Starkey
2005; Faulks 2006; Gillborn 2006; Frazer 2007; Arthur et al. 2008; Kiwan 2008). It
is therefore instructive to examine the bases on which commentators have sought
to assess good citizenship claims and frames in this context. The domain of citizen-
ship education is shaped materially and institutionally through the writing of policy
recommendations (‘The Crick Report’, QCA 1998), its legislation through the
statutory ‘Citizenship Order’ (QCA 1999), the provision of guidance and advice to
teachers, the inception of PGCE (Post-Graduate Certificate in Education) teacher-
training courses and the production of examination questions and textbooks. These
activities involve constructing a specific sense of the good citizen to be fostered
through education.
As such, the domain of citizenship education will highlight particular aspects of the
framing model, such as framing mostly by elite actors (as opposed to those citizens
and future citizens who are ‘being educated’), a focus on the individual as good
citizen and his or her duties (as opposed to organisations or institutions as good
citizens).
The very notion of citizenship education frames the good citizen in particular ways,
namely as someone who needs to be educated to be a good (better) citizen, in ways
devised by others. This places those pronouncing on citizenship education in some
kind of position of authority, both in terms of their self-understanding and, fre-
quently, in terms of their institutional position (for example as experts commis-
sioned by the government or as academic experts). Similarly, it puts those then
charged with delivering citizenship education in an institutional position of author-
ity over the (future) citizens they are educating. Those being educated are placed in
the positions of not-yet-good-enough citizens, of having to learn what being a good
citizen means and how they should act in order to be good citizens. The motives of
those framing citizenship education are presumably either to find a way to produce
better citizens (and by implication to establish the understanding that this is nec-
essary, desirable and feasible) or to critique the idea that citizens need to be
educated (or educated in this particular way). The methods employed include
normative, processual and critical arguments, designed to establish what virtues a
good citizen ought to possess and how these virtues should be encouraged/
produced; and bringing forward alternative theoretical frameworks from which
either the very notion of citizenship education, or citizenship education in a par-
ticular form, can be critiqued.
In terms of the approach to framing citizenship education we can usefully trace the
positioning, motives and methods of the proponents of citizenship education. The
Crick Report’s approach to citizenship education is positioned as one informed by
civic republicanism and pluralism in contrast to modern liberalism (Crick 2002,
501). Bernard Crick’s rejection of the figure of the ‘good citizen’ reflects this civic
republican standpoint, and instead he promotes a new figure of the ‘active citizen’
who is effective, participative, publicly minded, politically literate and sceptical. The
citizenship claimed and valued here means ‘people acting together publicly and
effectively to demonstrate common values and achieve common purposes’ (Crick
2007, 247, emphasis in original).
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Motivated by an account of improving the ‘health’ of democracy (QCA 1998, 8),
citizenship education is directed towards a societal context that is represented as
politically apathetic, at youth who feel alienated and cynical and at a pluralistic
British population, who, it is said, need to find common ground (QCA 1998,
13–17). Here, the good citizen is put forward as someone who is socially and
morally responsible, involved in their community and politically literate. However,
Crick (2007, 243) again carefully distinguishes between the good citizen and the
active citizen. He asserts:
It seems elementary to me that there is a difference between being a good
citizen and being an active citizen (Crick, 2000). One can be a good citizen
in an autocratic state. One can also be only a good citizen in a democratic
state, that is one can obey the law, pay taxes, drive carefully and behave
oneself socially (say minimising offence to others) but not work with
others on any matters that effect public policy (emphasis in original).
Crick is therefore critical of earlier approaches to citizenship education, such as the
work of the Commission on Citizenship (NCC 1990), which he notes promoted a
particularly partisan version of ‘highly moralistic “good citizenship” of which
Douglas Hurd, Kenneth Baker and Chris Patten spoke: the moral virtues of helping
others and behaving well’ (Crick 2002, 492). Crick’s method, then, is to invoke the
‘active citizen’ as a common-sense response to the social, political and cultural
context of the UK presented above.
The framing method deployed by those, like Crick, who have promoted citizenship
education in this sense involves presenting the justification of these explicit
attempts to shape young people as good, that is, ‘active’, citizens as an apolitical and
non-partisan approach (Crick 2002, 494). Method is therefore related to position-
ing, where actors (whether individuals or organisations) will often attempt to
position themselves as more-or-less neutral and objective—they seek to elucidate
citizenship and good citizenship from a general vantage point. For Crick, this means
locating his approach as a reflection of the ‘procedural values’ of ‘Freedom, Tolera-
tion, Fairness, Respect for Truth, Respect for Reasoning’ (Crick 1999, 343), which
(as he recognises) stem from a specifically ‘Western tradition’ (Crick 1999, 337).
Indeed, efforts have been made to unpack the methods followed by the Crick
committee in arriving at a consensus framing of the good citizen. In particular, Dina
Kiwan (2006, 131) has asserted that the citizenship education policy-making
process excluded ethnic minority voices, questioning the internal consistency of the
Crick committee’s claims as an act of (non-inclusive, non-participatory) citizenship
in itself. Similarly, Pykett (2007) has explored how multiple framings of the good
citizen were dealt with by the Crick committee in order to resolve potential conflicts
of opinion and ensure that the final recommendations were politically acceptable.
This resolution suggests that realpolitik was a crucial framing method in the case of
citizenship education. Some policy-makers involved in the Crick committee had
their own framings to pursue—the good citizen as critical and rights-driven, rather
than active, responsible and compliant; as engaged in experiential, community
learning rather than complying with an education system driven by testing and
standards; or as a global, rather than a UK, citizen (Pykett 2007).
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We move now to academic and popular critics of citizenship education, who are
equally concerned with framing the good citizen—positioning themselves variously
as politically motivated critics, ‘common-sense’ advocates, sociological interpreters,
impartial evaluators and/or outside observers. By examining existing criticism of
the ‘official’ framing of the good citizen as actively involved in the community, as
socially and morally responsible and politically literate, we can identify the alter-
native framings offered as a basis for such critiques. While the motives of critique
are not always to create an alternative framing of the good citizen in education,
such a figure often emerges from the analytical work of criticism. Methods
employed by critics include revealing inconsistencies, exposing competing claims to
the good citizen, reviving the value of political contestation, describing alternative
claims, outlining historically contingent claims of the good citizen and, indeed,
deconstructing the basis from which citizen claims and critiques can be brought
about.
Alternative framings of the good citizen can arise from such critiques. For instance,
Elizabeth Frazer (2007, 258) condemns the vagueness of the acts and virtues of the
good citizen figure promoted in citizenship education:
To be sure with this kind of very general definition we can speak of a ‘good
citizen’ as any one who, in any community whatsoever, pulls their weight
with regards to the common good, upholds the organisation and its
values, takes responsibility and so on. And we do talk this way. But if we
consistently think of citizenship without any reference to political power,
we are omitting something crucial.
In reviving a positive sense of the political as necessarily difficult and conflict-based
(Frazer 2007, 258–259), the framing of the good citizen that emerges from Frazer’s
criticism is of someone who has a ‘positive appreciation of the values of politics’
(Frazer 2007, 261). This is someone who is committed to seeking and participating
in legitimate procedures for political decision-making, rather than somebody who
simply acts responsibly in an ill-defined community.
In other analyses of citizenship education, critics draw attention to the apparently
homogeneous figure of the good citizen whose ethnic difference is erased. Audrey
Osler (2000, 27) highlights how the Crick Report fails to deal with the issue of
racism as a threat to democracy and identifies a ‘colonial flavour’ to its writing
(Osler 2000, 30). David Gillborn (2006, 83) states that the citizenship education
policy is a ‘pretend treatment for institutional racism’ which he underlines as a
reality of the current education system, stating that citizenship education leaves the
systematic problem of racial exclusion intact (Gillborn 2006, 88)—painting it
instead as an individual problem. Here, critics focus on the way in which citizenship
education policy therefore frames the bad citizen as an overly individualistic char-
acter responsible for racial conflict or an individual from an ethnic minority who
fails to integrate themselves fully into a tolerant majority community (Osler 2000,
33). By implication then, the good citizen framed in such critiques would be
someone who understands and challenges institutional injustices and barriers to
citizenship from a human rights perspective. These critics reject the search for a
‘common good’ shared by citizens in favour of a genuine respect for diversity.
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It is therefore clear that challenges to the official framing of the good citizen in the
domain of citizenship education exist in many forms. Other frames (most notably
in the form of critiques) equally make claims about the characteristics and activities
of the good citizen, though few, of course, become government policy—marking
out the practices, mechanisms and institutions of elite rhetorical framing as par-
ticularly ripe for analysis. It is important to assess critically the basis of citizenship
claims by which educators seek to nurture good citizens, as well as to understand
the political goals and practices of their critics. This is particularly pertinent in the
domain of education where invoking the good citizen manifestly seeks to improve
and shape the future domain of democracy.
The Politics of Performative Framing
As the example of the framing of citizenship education in the Crick Report and its
critiques shows, framing is concerned with the formation of the virtuous character
of the good citizen as determined by their acts of citizenship, or what the active
citizen does. This involves invoking particular moral traits and values which in turn
shape our interpretations of the contexts in which the citizen acts. So the relation-
ship between framing and contexts is a mutually constitutive one, reflecting
Jacques Derrida’s (1988, 152) famous assertion that ‘there are only contexts, that
nothing exists outside context ... but also that the limit of the frame or the border of
the context always entails a clause of nonclosure’ (emphasis in original). In the
example of citizenship education, framing the good citizen as ‘active’ is made
possible by framing the context (in which the introduction of citizenship education
is deemed necessary) as one in which young people are apathetic, antisocial,
dealing poorly with diversity and lacking a cohesive sense of national identity and
civic responsibility. The performative nature of the relationship between framing
and context is noted by Ian Hunter and Denise Meredyth (2001, 71), who argue
that civic education does not simply reflect or express the moral consensus of the
political community but indeed constructs it. They therefore regard citizenship edu-
cation as at risk of ‘turning the school system into an instrument of moral coercion,
jeopardizing its role as an instrument of social governance’ (Hunter and Meredyth
2001, 69). The framing of the good citizen as active and reflective, they suggest
(Hunter and Meredyth 2001, 88), may be itself specific to the ‘western’ context in
which the Christian enlightenment norm of ‘critical autonomy and confessional
enthusiasm’ informs the everyday practices of schooling.
The broader point here is that good citizens are made, not born, and that they are
made in, and by, the image of key actors whose acts constitute operative ideas of
good citizenship. Not all acts or frames have equal purchase; those that are
materially and institutionally embedded and proposed by elite actors have more of
what can be termed performative power. To use the dramaturgical metaphors of
Goffman (1969 and 1974), there is staging and scriptwriting for the good citizen
which presents a figure of the good citizen to be enacted. This goes some way
towards explaining why framing has important implications for political theory—
limiting as it does the range of subject positions available to be performed, while at
the very same time opening up the possibility for multiple and coexisting frames.
Goffman’s (1974, 10) concept of frame analysis as an interpretative schema for the
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organisation of experience is instructive in that it suggests a concern not with who
the good citizen is but with how the good citizen is mediated and framed—how the
status of citizenship is not possessed, but performed; ‘something that must be
realised’ (Goffman 1969, 81, emphasis added).
Butler’s (1997) reading of the politics of the performative helps us to get to the
heart of what is at stake in this performative account of framing and the realisation
of the good citizen. She raises vital questions as to whether citizens will choose or
accept to play the role as offered to them. Through her analysis of speech acts, she
points us towards the fine-grained mechanics of framing with which we are con-
cerned. For Butler (1997, 3), illocutionary speech acts such as the moment a judge
says ‘I sentence you’ constitute in the very act of speaking both the ‘deed’ itself and
the addressee him/herself. In the same way, framing the good citizen actively
constitutes the domains in which such frames seek to intervene, and since speech
acts proceed within an already delineated ‘linguistic domain’ (Butler 1997, 28), the
conditions of possibility for speaking subjects are already framed. Thus, the
mechanics of framing, the organisation of experience through elite rhetoric, the
symbolic and material reproduction of the good citizen and the institutional reifi-
cation of such frames become integral to assessing critically the politics of the perfor-
mative constitution of the good citizen through acts. Two important elements of Butler’s
thesis are worth noting here in relation to the framing of the good citizen in the
domain of citizenship education. First, that the framing of the good citizen requires
a recognition of authority—as we have noted, claims, frames and critiques of good
citizenship in the field of education abound, but only the elite framing offered in the
Crick Report became a statutory instrument legislating for a particular kind of
citizenship education. Secondly, performative speech can become efficacious through
written texts and reproduced language (Butler 1997, 32)—in this case, through the
Citizenship Order, National Curriculum programmes of study and the numerous
instructional textbooks on citizenship education for teachers and pupils alike.
Butler’s work is generally understood to be an exploration of the way in which
citizens perform themselves—acting out certain repertoires that fit with context-
specific framings of what it means to be a good citizen. However, it is possible to
discern a second level of performativity in her theory, particularly where she
emphasises the role of authority figures and powerful texts. ‘Ordinary’ citizens need
a repertoire to act out, in order to constitute themselves performatively as (good)
citizens. This repertoire comes from the framing of a domain and the use of an
approach for invoking the good citizen. As such, a ‘prior’ or ‘primary’ stage of
performativity is necessary, referring to the construction of a domain in which the
performance of particular social roles is made possible. In distinguishing between
these two levels of performativity, and offering the shorthand of ‘elite’ and ‘ordi-
nary’ actors, we are prompted to concern ourselves with the politics of performative
framing. Understanding how power is diffused through the mechanisms and prac-
tices of framing opens up the possibility of ‘insurrectionary speech’ (Butler 1997,
163)—speech acts that exceed and evade the linguistic domain within which they
are enacted—and as such offers a basis for theoretical critique without resorting to
essentialist normative claims.
Making visible the political struggle associated with the process of assembling and
reproducing particular framings of the good citizen, we would argue, enables a
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critical assessment of the moral framings of citizenship claims in specific domains,
just as moral political theory more generally can be opened to critique—there being
no final philosophical position from which to judge framings of the good citizen.
The interpretive method involves unpacking the positioning, motives and methods
of citizenship claims, and understanding the way in which the representation of the
context or domain in which the good citizen acts is itself part and parcel of the
performative framing process.
As the idea of ‘framing’ and the above comments strongly imply, we suspend in our
work the idea that there can be a neutral perspective, or one ideal conception, of
the good citizen, whether related to virtues, behaviours, claims or actions. This is
because there are unavoidable issues of domain and approach (positioning, motive
and method) to be taken into account for any given case. But there is a great deal
of understanding to be gained from close attention to and interpretation of claims
in their specific contexts.
Conclusion
The question remains of how best to assess good citizenship claims in domains such
as citizenship education, where multiple perspectives and critiques prevail. The
broadly interpretive frame employed here carries with it a relativising perspective.
That is, it takes seriously the notion of good citizenly acts, and even virtues, but sees
these as gaining their substance through enactment in specific contexts. There
remains normative or critical potential in the idea of the good citizen when it is
approached in this way.
Note first that there are limits to the invocation of the good citizen; the latter might
be invoked in a plurality of domains and within a range of approaches, but in
nothing like an infinite variety of ways. The figure of the good citizen can mean
many things—varied connotations will escape stipulative attempts to stop at a
single denotation2—but it cannot mean just anything in, or for, any domain.
Figurative approaches stress an intersubjective bounding of socially acceptable
meanings of concepts, as opposed to literal strategies aimed at objectivity, and
abstract ones aimed at an atomistic subjectivity. We are not without critical
resources for interrogating the frames and claims of good citizenship. Our approach
has been based on a premise of visions of the good citizen being proposed (framed,
invoked), not imposed; on constitution and not imposition. We have provided a
framework that aims to open up these propositions and constitution to critical
scrutiny.
The complexity of invocations of good citizenship has been mapped out here in
terms of domains of concern about, and approaches to, the good citizen. We have
stressed how conceptions of the good citizen are performatively constituted
through framing devices. We have sought to illustrate and interrogate this point
through richness of empirical reference and through detailed discussion of the basis
of good citizenship claims. A theory of the framing of good citizenship allows us to
interrogate the positions and motives from which different actors make claims
about good citizenship and to unpack the methods by which they make these
claims. Understanding positions, motives and methods can help us in interpreting
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and assessing competing invocations of the good citizen and allows us to step away
from largely normative arguments of both politicians and academics which assume
that there is a convincing universal essence that makes for a good citizen. Instead,
the account we provide here seeks to investigate the politics that underpin the very
making of the good citizen. We have asserted that good citizenship, like democracy,
is always enacted (cf. Saward 2003), there being no inarguable definition of the
virtuous citizen. Such definitions are always changing, and are related to the
specific context in which good citizen propositions are made.
A number of key themes have emerged, each of which is suggestive in terms of how
research on good citizenship ought to be conducted. First, there is an unavoidable
situatedness to framing and invocation of the figure of the good citizen. The reality
of widespread disengagement from, and disenchantment with, representative
democratic politics is now largely accepted as a fact for the UK and several other
countries, not least in the affluent west. Political and research attention is focused
on citizen re-engagement. Issues of war, the environment, globalisation, cultural
difference and massive movements of peoples have also placed citizenship issues
firmly on to the agenda, not least around environmental responsibility, corporate
ethics and education for citizenship. It is such large-scale issues and questions that
prompt invocations of the good citizen. Or, in other words, a theory of the good
citizen cannot, we would argue, help but be contextual, and there remains more
detailed work to be done in order to take fully into account the located reasons for
its emergence and the specific character that debates around it take on in terms of
domain and approach.
Second, there is a dynamic plurality of perspectives on ‘the good citizen’, and on
ways of enacting good citizenship. The idea of the ‘good’ citizen is as evocative as it
can be elusive; other adjectives applied to citizen acts, such as active, proactive,
effective, engaged and even ‘good enough’, are sometimes preferred by participants
in UK debates. Equally, there are numerous ways to analyse and to interpret acts of
would-be good citizenship, influenced by the positioning, motives, goals and
guiding ideas of the observer. Government agencies, for example, still work on
blueprints for ideal citizens, and NGOs talk of fostering active or effective citizens,
but their notions of what constitutes good citizenship will be quite different.
Third, despite the plurality and complexity of the topic, we are not without
resources or direction; assessments of claims about good citizenship are possible and
feasible, if done with due sensitivity to context. We have shown that contextual and
intersubjective sensitivity is vital, while showing too that new analytical and inter-
pretive tools are needed to deal with this complexity. We have proposed an
approach that helps us to identify the core products and content of good citizenship
invocations, and brings both greater empirical breadth and theoretical depth to the
study of the good citizen. This approach, highlighting the performative constitution
of the domains of good citizenship, still leaves space for critical or normative
assessment of invocations. Using this sort of framework can, we trust, help us to
recognise and appraise the ethical force of the notion of the good citizen while
bringing a constructive scepticism to given claims about the good citizen.
As a final consideration—or provocation—our contribution also implicitly enters
into long-standing debates about the scope of the concept of citizenship itself.
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Behind these issues is a concern that multiple and varied invocations of the good
citizen play a part in ‘inflating’ the meaning of the concept of citizenship generally.
There is a real tension around the scope of ‘citizenship’: some would expand it to
include new claims, for example ecological, cultural and sexual, while others decry
such ‘inflation of meaning’ and seek to confine its scope in terms of a more limited
and conventional notion of status. Should scholars of citizenship be seeking to ‘pin
down’ and limit its meaning, or can they be content with tracing the expanding and
increasingly complex scope of its reference—or in other words keeping a rein on
citizenship’s tendency to be a ‘momentum concept’ that accrues meaning (Hoffman
2004, 12)? Is there a job to be done, tightening definitions and establishing bound-
aries? There do seem to be two threads underpinning varied topics in the field of
citizenship knowledges and capacities. The first thread holds the view that citizen-
ship’s meaning is necessarily evolutionary, seeing change as an opportunity to
critique existing orders and incorporate new claims, domains and frames into the
analysis of citizenship. The second thread sees continuity, constrains meaning and
holds the view that citizenship has a necessarily persistent meaning. Our analysis is
located in the first thread, concerned with understanding how particular meanings
of citizenship can be made to persist. Our framework provides a set of questions to
be asked of good citizen claims, and a set of interpretative tools for unpacking the
political positions, motives and methods that bolster such claims. This framework is
developed from an understanding of good citizenship acts as performative in their
constitution—as such it does not resort to foundational judgements of citizenship
norms but instead examines political struggles located between the spaces of elite
rhetoric and ordinary citizenly acts.
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Notes
1. Examination of the relationship between elite rhetoric and ‘public opinion’ is a central concern in
political studies, and equally so in the field of media and communication studies (Ober 1989; Zaller
1992; Koch 1998; Entman and Herbst 2001; Schildkraut 2002; Entman 2004). In particular, Druck-
man and Nelson (2003) investigate the interactions between elite framing and interpersonal conver-
sations between citizens. Druckman (2001) has also explored how citizens use frames rather than
being subject to their apparent manipulative forces. And Manza and Cook (2002) conversely explore
the impact of ordinary citizens’ framings on public policy.
2. See Barthes’ S/Z (1974) on the interplay between denotation and connotation and the inevitably
disruptive effect of connotative meanings.
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